| | Volume 1, Number 3
August 1985
A publication for the members of SOR
NOTES FROM PETER GORDON
Hey, get those rhinos away from my Lear jet. Early this
spring, Thomas Jukes, Professor of Biophysics at UC Berkeley, and
indefatigable anti-creationist, wrote (in a letter to Kevin Wirth,
SOR Director of Research) that creationists who denied "the
overwhelming molecular evidence for evolution" lacked "scientific
credibility" and could be "compared to rhinoceroses wandering
through a jet-airplane factory." Jukes wrote, further, of the
"beauties of modern discoveries in molecular evolution," a
sentiment he shares with many other evolutionists: it is widely
believed that the data found in theories of molecular evolution
provide exactly the sort of hard evidence the general theory of
evolution requires. Bernard Davis (Bacterial Physiology Unit,
Harvard Medical School) put the matter very plainly, when he wrote
recently:
In most of its development evolutionary biology has depended on
morphological homologies, both in the fossil record and
among living species; but this approach has not revealed the
continuum of transition forms between species that Darwin
predicted. Moreover, while he expected further research in
paleontology to fill in the gaps, we no longer entertain that
hope. But now, at last, molecular genetics has provided a
direct, radically different kind of evidence for such
continuity...Not only does molecular genetics provide the
most convincing evidence for evolutionary continuity, but
this evidence should impress a public that is well aware of
the power of this science in other areas. ("Molecular
Genetics and the Foundations of Evolution", Perspectives in
Biology and Medicine, vol. 28: pp. 252-253, Winter 1985)
It is clear that Jukes and Davis, among many others, hope that
the molecular evidence will explain--and persuade--where other
evidence has failed. But several puzzles have emerged from the
study of molecular genetics, puzzles which ought to dampen the
enthusiastic claims made for the evidence.
A number of these puzzles are examined in a recent paper by
Paul Erbrich (Hochschule fur Philosophie, Munich), "On the
Probability of the Emergence of a Protein with a Particular
Function," Acta Biotheoretica, vol. 34: pp. 53-80, 1985. Erbrich
writes, in the abstract:
Proteins with nearly the same structure and function
(homologous proteins) are found in increasing numbers in
phylogenetically different, even very distant taxa
(e.g. hemoglobins in vertebrates, in some invertebrates, and
even in certain plants)...The probability...of the convergent
evolution of two proteins with approximately the same
structure and function is too low to be plausible, even when
all possible circumstances are present which seem to heighten
the likelihood of such a convergence. If this is so, then
the plausibility of a random evolution of two or more
different but functionally related proteins seems hardly
greater. (p. 53)
The bulk of Erbrich's paper is devoted to a careful, critical
quantitative analysis of the likelihood of molecular evolution.
In his conclusions, however, he points out that some larger
issues are involved:
The probability for the de novo emergence of a particular
protein by chance alone is extremely small, even for a very
imperfect one...Why then does the scientific theory of
evolution hold on to the concept of chance to the degree it
does? I suspect it is the fact that there is no alternative
whatsoever which could explain the fact of universal
evolution, at least in principle, and be formulated within
the framework of natural science. If no alternative should
be forthcoming, if chance remains overtaxed, then the
conclusion seems inevitable that evolution and therefore
living beings cannot be grasped by natural science to the
same extent as non-living things--not because organisms are
so complex, but because the explaining mechanism is
fundamentally inadequate. (pp. 77-78)
Recent Work from Australia. Question: will Michael Ruse
ever have a (semi) kind word to say about creationism, or the
work of creationists?
Answer: probably no time soon. But in a review published in
New Scientist, 13 June 1985, p. 33, he did see fit to call the
theory of creation a "paradigm," a nearly respectable term, quite
a distance from some of Ruse's earlier judgments (such as
"Scientific Creationism is not just wrong: it is ludicrously
implausible. It is a grotesque parody of human thought, and a
downright misuse of human intelligence." Darwinism Defended,
p. 303) Ruse was reviewing Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, by
Michael Denton, an Australian molecular biologist (Burnett Books,
pp. 368). As far as I am aware, the book has not yet found an
American publisher; SOR will be attempting to obtain a copy for
review.
Denton's book sounds very interesting, although it "produces a
rather dreary sense of deja vu" in Ruse. According to Ruse,
Denton "gives us much critical writing about paths (of change),
which is then generalized, even to the fact of evolution." Ruse
denies that "questions about mechanism" cast any doubt "on the
fact of evolution." I have to disagree. While once I might have
agreed, this answer (which aims at preserving the mysterious fact
of evolution) seems to me to be increasingly barren, a mere
dodge.
Evolution is, if anything, a theory of transformation,
and transformation requires a mechanism. The connection between
the postulated mechanisms of evolution, and its status as fact,
is critical, far more than many evolutionists care to admit.
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